University of Florida Journal of Law & Public Policy
Volume 3

Issue 1

Article 4

1990

Fair Report Privilege as a Libel Defense: Status for Foreign
Government Statements
Kyu Ho Youm

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/jlpp

Recommended Citation
Youm, Kyu Ho (1990) "Fair Report Privilege as a Libel Defense: Status for Foreign Government
Statements," University of Florida Journal of Law & Public Policy: Vol. 3: Iss. 1, Article 4.
Available at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/jlpp/vol3/iss1/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UF Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in University of Florida Journal of Law & Public Policy by an authorized editor of UF Law Scholarship
Repository. For more information, please contact kaleita@law.ufl.edu.

FAIR REPORT PRIVILEGE AS A LIBEL DEFENSE:
STATUS FOR FOREIGN GOVERNMENT STATEMENTS
Kyu Ho Youm, Ph.D.*
I.

INTRODUCTION ...........................

II.

THE FAIR REPORT PRIVILEGE: ITS ORIGIN AND
RATIONALES .............................

A.
B.
III.

29

31
English History ........................... 31
American History ........................ 33

FOURTH

CIRCUIT DENIES PRIVILEGE TO FOREIGN

GOVERNMENT ............................

37

IV.

IMPLICATIONS OF LEE FOR THE PRESS ...........

44

V.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

48

I.

................

INTRODUCTION

Under Anglo-American libel law, "talebearers are as bad as
talemakers."' Restatement (Second) of Torts, summarizing the republisher's liability, notes: "Except as to those who only deliver or transmit defamation published by a third person, one who repeats or otherwise republishes defamatory matter is subject to liability as if he had
originally published it. "2 More often than not, however, the republication rule is qualified by the "fair report privilege, '3 which has been
termed a "strategic" exception to the general rule of republication
liability. 4 Indeed, the fair report privilege permits publication of ac-

* Assistant Professor, School of Communication, University of Miami, Coral Gables, Florida.
1. Harris v. Minvielle, 19 So. 925, 928 (La. Ct. App. 1896). See also Houston Chronicle
Publishing Co. v.Wegner, 182 S.W. 45, 48 (Tex. Cir. App. 1915).
2. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 578 (1977). One legal scholar observed that the
republication rule is based on the fiction that one who repeats a libel or slander "adopts it as
his own." See Robertson, Defamation and the First Amendment: In Praiseof Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 54 TEX. L. REV. 199, 262-63 n.388 (1976), citing Evans v. Smith, 5 B. Mon. 363
(Ky. 1845).
3. The fair report privilege is also known as "official report privilege," "public records
privilege," "reporter's privilege," or "public eye doctrine." See D. GILLMOR, J. BARRON, T.
SIMON & H. TERRY, MASS COMMUNICATION LAW 250 (5th ed. 1990); R. SACK LIBEL, SLANDER, AND RELATED PROBLEMS

4.

B.

SANFORD,

316 (1980).

LIBEL AND PRIVACY

370 (1987).
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counts of public or governmental proceedings or reports despite their
5
defamatory nature.
The fair report privilege is viewed historically as the "single most
important media defense. '' 6 Notwithstanding the "actual malice" rule
enunciated in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,7 it still thrives as
"one of the most powerful and frequently invoked common law defenses, particularly for the press."" The privilege may apply even
when the New York Times defense fails. Further, the privilege does
not depend upon whether the target of defamation is a public figure
or a private individual. Indeed, one author has expressed concern
that, combined with the protection provided by the actual malice rule,
the fair report privilege may create too great a burden for plaintiffs. 9
Consequently, the privilege should be rigidly defined and limited in
its application to prevent abuse.10
In Lee v. Dong-A Ilbo," the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit agreed with the need to limit the application of
the fair report privilege. The court refused to extend the privilege to
a press account based on the proceedings or reports of a foreign
government.' 2 This precedent-setting interpretation of the fair report
privilege in the context of republication of a defamatory foreign gov-

5. The publication of defamatory matter concerning another in a report of an official action
or proceeding or a meeting open to the public that deals with a matter of public concern is
privileged if the report is accurate and complete or a fair abridgement of the occurrence reported.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 611 (1977). According to one commentator, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 611 (1977) has been adopted by at least twenty-one jurisdictions
as a foundation for recognizing the privilege as a libel defense. See Bech, Isolating the Marketplace of Ideas from the World: Lee v. Dong-A Ilbo and the Fair Report Privilege, 50 U.
Pirr. L. REV. 1153, 1157 n.13 (1989).
6. Sowle, Defamation and the First Amendment: The Case for a Constitutional Privilege
of FairReport, 54 N.Y.U. L. REV. 469, 475 (1979).
7. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). The "actual malice" rule requires that the public official plaintiff
prove the defamatory statement was made "with knowledge that it was false or with reckless
disregard of whether it was false or not." Id. at 280.
8. R. SMOLLA, LAW OF DEFAMATION 8-34 (1988). See also K. MIDDLETON & B. CHAMBERLIN, THE LAW OF PUBLIC COMMUNICATION 144 (1988) (characterizing the privilege as
the "most important" libel defense in the post-New York Times Co. era); Sanford, supra note
4, at 370 (terming the privilege the "most useful" common law defense).
9. M. MAYER, THE LIBEL REVOLUTION: A NEW LOOK AT DEFAMATION AND PRIVACY
131-32 (1987). Indeed, the Supreme Court of California noted recently: "These constitutional
obstacles to recovery [created by New York Times and its progeny] provide even greater
protection for the news media than the common law privileges." Brown v. Kelly Broadcasting
Co., 771 P.2d 406, 429 (Cal. 1989).
10.
M. MAYER, supra note 9, at 131-32.
11. 849 F.2d 876 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1343 (1989).
12. Id. at 880.
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ernment report'3 may have important implications for the American
press. It is not surprising, therefore, that the media has criticized the
Fourth Circuit's decision. For example, a Washington Post editorial
denounced the Fourth Circuit ruling as "preposterous," arguing that
the opinion was a "narrow view strangl[ing] the free flow of important
information [and] should be revised at the first opportunity.' ' 4 Editor
& Publisher, the trade journal of the American daily newspapers,
characterized the ruling in Lee as an "[i]nsult to foreign governments."' 5 It also stated that the decision will deprive the American
people of considerable information about foreign governments.' 6
Examining the impact of Lee upon the American press, this study
pursues three lines of inquiry concerning the fair report privilege.
First, what is the common law and statutory evolution of the fair
report privilege as a libel defense in Anglo-American law? Second,
what is the judicial interpretation in Lee of the privilege with regard
to publication of foreign government reports? Finally, what are the
implications of Lee for the American press?

II.

THE FAIR REPORT PRIVILEGE: ITS ORIGIN AND RATIONALES

A.

English History

The fair report privilege appears to have its genesis in Curry v.
Walter,'7 an English libel case of 1796.18 The Curry court stated:
"[T]hough the matter contained in the paper might be very injurious
to the character of the magistrates, yet . . .being a true account of
what took place in a court of justice which is open to all the world,
the publication of it was not unlawful."'19 In recognizing the privilege
of the press to accurately report "open" judicial proceedings, the Eng-

13. See id. at 878 (noting that American courts have never addressed the issue of republication liability involving reports of foreign government acts). But cf. Saenz v. New York Tribune,
290 N.Y.S. 316, 318-24 (Sup. Ct. 1936) (recognizing the fair report privilege for a newspaper
story of Cuban criminal proceedings initiated against plaintiff, a former Cuban secretary of
treasury and a New York resident at the time the proceedings were initiated); Sharon v. Time,
599 F. Supp. 538, 542-43 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (stating in dictum that much of the matter in the
defendant's article on the Kahan Commission report on the Lebanon massacre would have been
protected under the fair report privilege in that it was "the fair report of a judicial proceeding"
of Israel).
14. Editorial, Stifling the News From Abroad, Washington Post, Mar. 7, 1989, at A24.
15. Editorial, Insult to Foreign Governments, Editor & Publisher, Mar. 18, 1989, at 4.
16. Id.
17. 1 Bos. & Pul. 525, 126 Eng. Rep. 1046 (C.P. 1796) (Eyre, C.J.).
18. See Sowle, supra note 6, at 478.
19. Curry, 1 Bos. & Pul. at 526, 126 Eng. Rep. at 1046.
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lish courts accepted the role of the press as an agent for conveying
to the public information already in the public domain. Under the
initially recognized agency theory of the privilege, the news reporter
functions as nothing but a "substitute for the public eye," informing
members of the public of what transpires in a public, official proceeding °
The socio-political setting of England in the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries contributed to the birth of the common law libel
defense.21 According to some authorities,- English case law at the end
of the eighteenth century demonstrated a judicial attempt to rectify
the abuses of the Star Chamber during the seventeenth century by
ensuring that "the proceedings of Courts of Justice should be universally known."- The privilege was expanded to include accounts of
parliamentary reports? and debates. 25 When the English courts balked
at recognizing the privilege beyond judicial and parliamentary proceedings, however, Parliament led the way to steady expansion of the
privilege, starting with the Newspaper Libel and Registration Act of
1881.26 Under the Act, the privilege applied to reports of nongovernmental public proceedings.27 The Defamation Act of 1952 extended the privilege defense to broadcasts within the United Kingdom.In 1960, an English court interpreted the privilege within the context of newspaper republications of foreign judicial proceedings. In
Webb v. Times Publishing Co.,2 the Court for the Queen's Bench

20.

W.

KEETON,

D.

DOBBS,

R.

KEETON &

D.

OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE

LAW OF TORTS 836 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS].
21. See F. SIEBERT, THE RIGHTS AND PRIVILEGES OF THE PRESS 190-91 (1934).

22. D. ELDER, THE FAIR REPORT PRIVILEGE 15 (1988); Comment, Constitutional
Privilege to Republish Defamation, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 1266, 1268 n.21 (1977).
23. The King v. Wright, 8 T.R. 293, 298, 101 Eng. Rep. 1396, 1399 (1799) (Lawrence, J.).
24. See id. at 298, 101 Eng. Rep. at 1399.
25. See Wason v. Walter, L.R. 4 Q.B. 73, 96 (1868).
26. Newspaper Libel and Registration Act, 1881, 44 & 45 Vict., ch. 60, § 4.
27. Id. The privilege section of the Newspaper Libel and Registration Act of 1881 was
somewhat modified by the Law of Libel Amendment Act of 1888. See Law of Libel Amendment
Act, 1888, 51 & 52 Vict. ch. 64, § 4. For a discussion of the Libel Amendment Act, see Fraser,
The Privileges of the Press in Relation to the Law of Libel, 7 LAW Q. REV. 158 (1891).
28. Defamation Act, 1952, 15 & 16 Geo. 6 & 1 Eliz. 2, ch. 66, § 9, sub. 2. For a discussion
of the Defamation Act of 1952, see Todd, The DefamationAct, 1952, 16 MOD. L. REV. 198 (1953).
29. 2 Q.B. 535 (1960). For analyses of Webb v. Times Publishing Co., see Notes, 76 LAW
Q. REV. 481 (1960); Payne, Qualified Privilege, 24 MOD. L. REV. 178 (1961); Reports of Foreign
Judicial Proceedings, Scots Law Times, Jan. 28, 1961, pp. 17-19; Williams, Defamation Report of Foreign Judicial Proceedings, 1960 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 149.

FAIR REPORT PRIVILEGE AS A LIBEL DEFENSE

ruled that if public interest dictated that certain foreign court proceedings should be reported in English media, then those reports would be
privileged. s° In Webb, the ex-wife of a man tried for murder and
acquitted in an English court sued The Times over the publication of
her ex-husband's testimony in a subsequent trial.1 The plaintiff in
Webb claimed that her ex-husband's testimony in a Swiss murder trial
indicated that she had committed adultery and perjury.2 In the previous murder trial, the plaintiff testified that she never had met the victim.- Balancing the public benefit from reporting foreign judicial proceedings against the incidental defamatory injury to individuals, the
English court recognized a limited privilege to report subject matter
in which the British public had a legitimate interest.- The Court
distinguished "a legitimate and proper interest" from "an interest
which is due to idle curiosity or a desire for gossip."3 1 One commentator
characterized the Webb decision as "a case of first impression founded
. . . openly on general considerations of public advantage. '"B.

American History

Although American courts first turned to English law in applying
the fair report privilege, their approach to applying the privilege was

30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Webb, 2 Q.B. at 568-69.
Id. at 537-39.
Id. at 568-69.
Id. at 537-39.
Id. at 568-69.
Id. at 569. Justice Pearson, illustrating the distinction, said:
A report of the decision of the United States Supreme Court on an important
question of commercial law has legitimate and proper interest. On the other hand,
a report of a judicial proceeding concerned with an alleged scandalous affair between
Mrs. X and Mr. Y is unlikely to have such interest and is likely to appeal only to
idle curiosity or a desire for gossip.
Id. at 569-70. Justice Pearson further stated:
Sometimes a report of foreign judicial proceedings will have intrinsic world-wide
importance, so that a reasonable man in any civilized country, wishing to be well-informed, will be glad to read it, and he would think he ought to read it if he has
the time available. Sometimes a report of foreign judicial proceedings will not have
such intrinsic world-wide importance, but will have a special connection with English affairs, so that it will have a legitimate and proper interest for English readers,
and the reasonable man in England will wish to read it or hear about it.
Id. at 570.
36. Payne, supra note 29, at 181. He further stated that, "Though public interest has been
the ultimate criterion, it is fair to say that the predominant approach has been to ask whether
inconvenience would be caused by denying protectionto a communication, rather than whether
a legitimate interest is served by publication." Id. (emphasis added). See also Williams, supra
note 29, at 149 (terming the Webb ruling "a learned and careful judgement").

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA JOURNAL OF LAW & PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 3

more liberal than that of British courts. For example, in the 1856
media libel case of Barrows v. Bell3 7 the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that the privilege protected a report of a disciplinary
meeting of the nongovernmental Massachusetts Medical Society.38
Writing for the court, Chief Justice Shaw stated:
[W]hatever may be the rule as adopted and practised on in
England, we think that a somewhat larger liberty may be
claimed in this country and in this commonwealth, both for
the proceedings before all public bodies, and for the publication of those proceedings for the necessary information of
the people9
Notwithstanding the Massachusetts court's expansive application of
the fair report privilege, American courts have not been uniformly
generous in defining the scope of the privilege. 40 To remedy this, some
state legislatures have passed statutes broadening the common law
privilege. For example, in 1854 the New York legislature responded
to the New York Superior Court's denial of the privilege to publication
of ex parte judicial proceedings.41 Directly addressing the judicial refusal to apply the privilege to ex parte criminal proceedings, a New
York statute42 stipulated that "the fact that he who claims to be libeled
by the report was not a party to the judicial proceedings does not
affect the privilege. '"- In addition to the informational rationale set
37. 73 Mass. 301 (1856). The Barrows case is said to be the first court decision in the
United States recognizing the fair report privilege. See Webb, Lee v. Dong-A Ilbo: Use of
Official Report Privilege to Protect Defamatory Statements in PressAccount Based on Foreign
Government Report, 23 GA. L. REV. 275, 279 (1988).
38. Barrows, 73 Mass. at 313.
39. Id.
40. Snwle, supru netc 6, at 480. A journalism scholar has noted that American courts'
refusal in the nineteenth century to expand the privilege beyond its British parameters was in
part related to "judges' displeasure with the increased sensational reporting of crime news and
the insertion of editorial comment into crime and trial stories" in the American commmercial
press. See T. GLEASON, THE WATCHDOG CONCEPT 65 (1990).
41. See Matthews v. Beach, 5 Sand. 256, 264 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1851), rev'd on other grounds,
8 N.Y. 173 (1853); Stanley v. Webb, 4 Stan. 21, 30-31 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1850).
42. An Act in Relation to Libel, 1854 N.Y. Laws ch. 130. A media law authority has
described the New York law as "ground breaking" for the privilege. See H. NELSON, D.
TEETER & D. LE Duc, LAW OF MASS COMMUNICATIONS 217 (6th ed. 1989).
43. An Act in Relation to Libel, 1854 N.Y. Laws ch. 130. M. NEWELL, THE LAW OF
LIBEL AND SLANDER 544 (2d ed. 1897), citing Ackermann v. Jones, 37 N.Y. Super. Ct. 42
(1874). A legal historian explains that the New York legislature's liberal recognition of the
privilege was in no small measure precipitated by the then exploding popular press in the
mid-nineteenth century America. See H. NELSON, LIBEL IN NEWS OF CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION COMMITTEES 12 (1961).

FAIR REPORT PRIVILEGE AS A LIBEL DEFENSE

forth in Barrows, the privilege is also justified on the ground that it
provides a means of monitoring government conduct." Justice Holmes,
then of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, formulated the
supervisory rationale for the privilege in the 1884 libel action of Cowley
v. Pulsifer.45 Holmes wrote:
[T]he privilege and the access of the public to the courts
stand in reason upon common ground. It is desirable that
the trial of causes should take place in the public eye, not
because the controversies of one citizen with another are of
public concern, but because it is of the highest moment that
those who administer justice should always act under the
sense of public responsibility and that every citizen should
be able to satisfy himself with his own eyes as to the mode
in which a public duty is performed.46
Thus, the supervisory theory is considered the "pivotal raison d'etre"
for fair report 47 in that it directly relates to the democratic body polity
of the United States where the people are the governors to whom
the government is accountable for its actions."4
A more expansive view of the American courts is posited on the
basic principle of American democracy. The public should be informed
about events that affect its welfare. The informational rationale of the
privilege, which the Massachusetts court set forth in Barrows,49 is
intricately connected with the supervisory rationale of the privilege.
The public's informational right would be of little significance if it
were not recognized as a sine qua non of the public's right to monitor
its government.- ° Adopting the informational underpinning for the
privilege, some jurisdictions exempt the press from liability for publishing information of various proceedings, whether governmental or
non-governmental, so long as they are related to the general interest
of the public.51 This helps to explain why accentuating the informational
44. Wilson v. Birmingham Post, 482 So. 2d 1209, 1211 (Ala. 1986).
45. 137 Mass. 392 (1884).
46. Id. at 394 (emphasis added).
47. Elder, supra note 22, at 3.
48. See F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS 430-31 (1956) ("In a democratic
community where political power is vested in the people, it is essential that public proceedings
be published and widely disseminated.").
49. See supra note 37.
50. One authority on the fair report privilege has noted: "[T]he relationship between the
supervisory and informational rationales is almost symbiotic, and the decisions almost invariably
link the two functions in delineating the justification for fair report." Elder, supranote 22, at 4.
51. See generally PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS, supra note 20, at 836; Elder, supra
note 22, at 111-25.
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aspect of the privilege permits a more comprehensive analysis of public
interest.52
In the United States, the fair report privilege is largely a creation
of state defamation law.- Its recognition is statutory, judicial or both,
and application of the privilege varies from state to state. A number
of state laws qualify the privilege with fairness,- truth,- and absence
of malice in publication of reports of public proceedings- while others
place no such conditions upon the privilege. 57 In addition, some states
specifically limit the privilege to the press, as distinguished from the
general public.- Other states, however, fail to distinguish between
the public and the press in terms of their right to the privilege5s

52. Note, Privilege to Republish Defamation, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1102, 1113 (1964).
53. Lee, 849 F.2d at 877. Some authorities do use "state privilege" in referring to the
privilege. See T. CARTER, M. FRANKLIN & J. WRIGHT, THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE
FOURTH ESTATE 92 (4th ed. 1988); T. CARTER, M. FRANKLIN & J. WRIGHT, THE FIRST
AMENDMENT AND THE FIFTH ESTATE 537 (2d ed. 1989).
54. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13-A-11-161 (1982); CAL. PENAL CODE § 254-55 (West 1970);
GA. CODE ANN. § 51-5-9 (1982); IDAHO CODE §§ 6.710-11, .713 (1979); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 411.060 (Baldwin 1988); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:49 (West 1986); MONT. CODE ANN. §
27-1-804 (1985); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:43-1 (West Supp. 1986); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02-05
(1981); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2317.05, 2739.03 (Page 1981); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §
1443.1 (West Supp. 1985), tit. 21, § 772 (West 1983); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 20-11-5
(1987); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. art § 73.002 (Vernon 1986); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 45-2-3, 45-2-4, 45-2-10 (1981), § 76-9-504 (1978); VA. CODE § 2.1-37.14 (1979); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 9.58.050 (1977); Wyo. STAT. §§ 1-29-104, 1-29-106 (1988).
55. Id. The "truth" under the privilege doctrine is distinguished from that of the common
law "truth" defense. While the former concerns the accuracy of the republished defamation as
made in the course of an official proceeding, the latter is related to the issue of whether the
plaintiff actually did what the defamatory charge as published said he did. See James v. Powell,
152 S.E. 539, 546 (Va. 1936).
56. See supra note 54.
57. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-653 (1982); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §
600.2911 (West 1986); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.765 (West 1964); MONT. CODE ANN. 45-8-212
(1985); N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 74 (McKinney 1976); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 895.05 (West 1983).
58. The state of Washington, for example, requires that:
No prosecution for libel shall be maintained against a reporter,editor, proprietor,
or publisher of a newspaper for the publication therein of a fair and true report
of any judicial, legislative or other public and official proceeding, or of any statement, speech, argument, or debate in the course of the same, without proving
actual malice in making the report.
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.58.050 (1977) (emphasis added). See also ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 12-653 (1982); CAL. PENAL CODE § 254 (West 1970); IDAHO CODE §§ 6-710-11, 6-713, 18-4807
(1979); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2911 (West 1986); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:43-1 (West
Supp. 1986); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 73.002 (Vernon 1986); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-9-504
(1978); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 895.05 (1) (West 1983).
59. See e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-11-161 (1982); GA. CODE ANN. § 51-5-7 (1982); Ky. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 411.060 (Baldwin 1988); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:49 (West 1986); MINN.

FAIR REPORT PRIVILEGE AS A LIBEL DEFENSE

While an increasing number of states recognize variants of the
privilege through statutes,' the fair report privilege is still a judicial
creation in a majority of jurisdictions. To date, the United States
Supreme Court has not found a constitutional dimension in the
privilege, 61 though the Court has seemingly recognized the first amendment underpinnings of the common law defense.62 As the Third Circuit
in Medico v. Time, Inc.63 stated in 1981, "[F]ederal courts have, as a
matter of federal law, expressed reluctance to hold the press responsible for publication of defamatory statements originally uttered by
others," especially "when the source of newsworthy defamation is a
government official or report. '"
III.

FOURTH CIRCUIT DENIES PRIVILEGE TO FOREIGN
GOVERNMENT

Lee resulted from a lengthy press release issued in September 1985
by the South Korean government announcing the breakup of two student-run spy rings operating in the United States and West Germany.65
In the press release, the government identified the plaintiff, Chang-Sin
Lee, as a North Korean agent involved in the spy ring based in the
United States.- Disruption of the spy networks received extensive
coverage by the news media in South Korea. 67 Within several days,

§ 609.765 (West 1964);

MONT.CODE ANN. §§ 27-1-804, 45-8-212 (1985); N.Y. Civ.
CENT. CODE § 14-02-05 (1981); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 12, § 1443.1 (West Supp. 1985); tit. 21, § 772 (West 1983); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §
20-11-5 (1987); Wyo. STAT. §§ 1-29-104, 1-29-105 (1988).
60. For a collection of various "libel privilege statutes," see Sanford, supra note 4, at 571-661.
STAT. ANN.

RIGHTS LAW § 74

61.

(McKinney 1976); N.D.

See Cox Broadcasting v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975); Landmark Communications, Inc.

v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978); Time, Inc. v. Pape, 401 U.S. 279 (1979).

62.
U.S. at
63.
64.

See Landmark Communications, 435 U.S. at 829; Cohn, 420 U.S. at 469; Pape, 401
279; Greenbelt Coop. Publishing Ass'n v.Bresler, 398 U.S. 6 (1970).
643 F.2d 134 (3d. Cir. 1981).
Id. at 145. See also J. WATKINS, THE MASS MEDIA AND THE LAW 191 (1990) ("the

fair report privilege is compelled by the first amendment, although the Supreme Court has not
directly ruled on the question").
65. The 62-page press release, entitled "North Korean Activities in the South, Activist
Student Related Happenings; Campus Infiltration by Overseas Korean Students Espionage
Ring," was issued by the National Security and Planning Agency, formerly known as Korean
CIA, and the Military Security Command, both intelligence agencies of the South Korean government. See Joint Appendix to Appellate Brief at 229, Lee v. Dong-A Ilbo, 849 F.2d 876 (4th

Cir. 1988) (No. 87-2578) [hereinafter Appendix].
66. Lee, 849 F.2d at 877. For an English translation of the press release relevant to the
plaintiff, see id. at 230, 232, 234, 236, 238.
67. Joint Brief of Appellees at 6, Lee v. Dong-A Ilbo, 849 F.2d 876 (4th Cir. 1988) (No.
87-2578) [hereinafter Joint Brief].
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six newspapers and a public television station in Virginia carried reports of the spy ring, relying mainly on the accounts from the South
Korean press.68 Lee, then a permanent resident living in New York
City, 69 sued the newspapers and the television station for libel in the
United States District Court in Alexandria, Virginia. 70 He claimed
that the news stories injured his reputational interests by falsely identifying him as a North Korean agent. 71 The defendants moved for
summary judgment, asserting that their "accurate" accounts of the
press release of the Korean government were protected by the fair
report privilege, which applied to all foreign government official reports. 72 The plaintiff objected, arguing that extension of the privilege
to publication of defamatory foreign governmental records would serve
no public policy. 7Granting summary judgment for the defendants, 74 Judge Hilton
ruled that the "blanket" privilege should apply to the republication of
all government reports, domestic or foreign, in light of the United
States' "substantial" involvement in international relations with foreign
countries. 75 Judge Hilton reasoned further that "[t]his privilege is one
for the public's need to know what is happening in this country and

68. Lee, 849 F.2d at 877. For an English translation of pertinent segments of the news
stories on the spy ring, as published in the Korean-language newspapers in the United States,
see Appendix, supra note 65, at 66, 69, 72, 75, 78. For a story published in the Korea Herald,
an English-language daily, see Appendix, supra note 65, at 79-80. For an English translation
of the Korean-language KBS News Report, as broadcast on WNVC-TV see Appendix, supra
note 65, at 1882-83.
69. Id. at 877. Lee immigrated to the United States in 1975 and graduated from Western
Illinois University in 1984. When the press report was published in September, Lee was a
Korean citizen with the status of a permanent resident alien in the United States. See Brief of
Appellant at 2-3, Lee v. Dong-A Ilbo, 849 F.2d 876 (4th Cir. 1988) (No. 87-2578) [hereinafter
Appellant's Brief]. Since that time Lee has become a U.S. citizen. See Accurate Report of
Foreign Official Data Not Privileged, 12 THE NEWS MEDIA & THE LAW 34 (Fall 1988) [hereinafter Accurate Report].
70. Lee, 849 F.2d at 877. Lee filed his libel suit on August 21, 1986, less than one month
before Virginia's one-year statute of limitations expired. VA. CODE § 8.01-248 (1984) (covering
personal actions); see Evans v. Sturgill, 430 F. Supp. 1209 (W. Va. 1977) (reputational injury
gives rise to personal action).
71. Appellant's Brief, supra note 69 at 1.
72. Chang-Sin Lee v. Dong-A Ilbo, No. 86-0958-A, Memorandum Opinion In Support of
Order, at 3 (E.D.Va. Mar. 23, 1987) [hereinafter Memorandum Opinion].
73. Id.
74. Id. The federal district court granted the defendants' motions for summary judgment
simply because the plaintiff failed to show actual malice in overcoming the fair report defense
against defamation. Id. at 6.
75. Id. at 6-7.
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in other nations, particularly where a news story has a significant
nexus ... between persons located in the United States and involved
with foreign governments. '76 In arguing for protection of foreign government statements under the privilege doctrine, Judge Hilton placed
greater emphasis upon the informational rationale of the doctrine than
77
upon its agency and supervisory justifications.
In his appeal, Lee argued that neither the supervisory nor the
informational rationale supported application of the privilege to foreign
government reports. 78 Asserting that the American public has no
supervisory role in the affairs of the Korean government, Lee contended that the extension of the privilege to publication of statements
by the Korean government served no purpose. 79 Lee also pointed out
that the informational theory underlying the privilege is not well
grounded as a rationale for extending the privilege to foreign government reports. 0 Lee added that the denial of the media privilege to
republish foreign government reports would have little impact upon
the American press as compared with the increased reputational injury
that might easily result from such republications.81 Lee further contended that the district court's recognition of other interests relating
to extension of the privilege to foreign governments was inadequate
as a rationale for the wholesale extension of the privilege because it
went too far in protecting the press at the expense of individual reputations.82
In response, the media defendants argued that the news media
functions as an informational agent for the public, which has a right

76. Id. at 9. Judge Hilton found a "nexus" between the subject of the press release by the
Korean government and the security interests of the United States in dealing with foreign
espionage agents. He also took note of the "legitimate and proper" interest of the Korean-American community particularly in the news release, which he held should be protected from defamation suits. Id.
77. See id. at 10 (referring to the "right of persons anywhere in the United States to be
informed of what governments in this nation and throughout the world are doing").
78. Appellant's Brief, supra note 69, at 5.
79. Id. at 11.
80. Id. at 18. Lee stated:
When measured against the marked increase in risk of defamation inherent in
the unbridled republication of official reports of foreign government actions and
proceedings, the importance of that "informational interest" is reduced. The
privilege could too easily be abused to shield republication of irresponsible, inaccurate and even intentionally defamatory statement.
Id.
81. Id. at 18-19.
82. Id. at 21.
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to know about foreign governments.8 Therefore, the privilege should
cover reports made by foreign governments. The defendants also
claimed that Lee failed to establish evidence of common-law malice in
their republishing of the Korean government press release.A8
In June 1988, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit reversed the lower court's ruling, holding that the fair report
privilege did not apply to reports of foreign government activities.8
The court noted that no American courts had confronted the question
of whether the privilege would apply to news accounts of foreign
government activities.8 6 In a 2-1 decision ' the court stated that the
privilege was not applicable to republication of foreign government
reports because of "other considerations" not associated with the traditional invocation of the privilege.A
While recognizing the three rationales underlying the privilege as
a libel defense, 9 the majority noted that "[s]tanding alone, an analysis

83. Joint Brief, supra note 67, at 15, 23. It is surprising that the defense totally relied on
the fair report privilege for its argument. No doubt it was a strategically unwise approach. The
defense could have employed the so-called "wire service" defense as an alternative in that the
facts precipitating the libel suit in Lee were similar to those often associated with the cases
involving the "wire service" defense. That is, under what one authority has called the "fairly
well established" wire service libel defense, Sanford, supra note 4, at 344, the "accurate"
republication of a dispatch provided by a "reputable wire service" is neither reckless nor negligent
as a matter of law. See Appleby v. Daily Hampshire Gazette, 478 N.E.2d 721, 725 (Mass. 1985),
citing eight cases in Florida, Puerto Rico, Hawaii, Alaska, New York, and the District of
Columbia. Notwithstanding the fact that the stories published by the newspapers and the
television station were not furnished by a wire service, it is indisputable that the defendant
news media used the stories provided by the highly regarded media in South Korea, which was
not negligent on the part of the defendants in that "requiring verification of wire service stories
[in the case of Lee, the Korean news media] prior to publication would impose a heavy burden
on the media's ability to disseminate newsworthy material." Appleby, 478 N.E.2d at 725. In
this context, might the Fourth Circuit have ruled as it did in Lee if the media defendants had
published the stories on the basis of the AP or UPI dispatches from South Korea? The case
law on the wire service defense most likely might have led the federal appeals court to rule
the other way.
84. Id. at 28.
85. Lee, 849 F.2d at 880.
86. Id. at 878. The court cited a 1960 English case, Webb v. Times Publishing Co. See id.
at 878 n.2 (noting a "limited" extension of the privilege to a Swiss "judicial" proceeding involving
an English citizen). For a discussion of Webb, see supra notes 29-36 and accompanying text.
87. Id. at 877, 880. Judge Ervin, who was joined by Judge Murnaghan, wrote the majority
opinion. Senior District Judge Kaufman, sitting by designation, dissented.
88. Lee, 849 F.2d at 879.
89. Id. at 878-79. In discussing the agency, public supervision, and informational rationales
for the privilege, the Fourth Circuit heavily relied upon Medico v. Time, Inc., 643 F.2d 134
(3d Cir. 1981).
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of these policy considerations supports the extension of the official
report privilege to reports of foreign government activities. '"- In the
context of the foreign government activities involved, however, the
majority found these considerations unpersuasive. Accepting the appellant's arguments in toto,91 the court concluded that the agency
rationale was not sufficiently strong because the information at issue
was available only in Korea.92 The supervisory rationale, the court
argued, was also unconvincing because foreign governments are not
directly accountable to the American people.93 On the other hand, the
court found the informational rationale directly applicable to the news
stories in question. Borrowing from the lower court's opinion,9 the
court said that Americans in general and Korean-Americans in particular possessed a strong interest in being informed about the disruption
of a spy ring in the United States by an American ally, South Korea. 9After concluding that the defendants failed to satisfy the criteria
for applying the privilege, the court focused on the distinction between
the American government and foreign governments. Since foreign
governments are "not necessarily familiar, open, reliable, or accountable" to the same extent as the American government, the court stated
that reports concerning foreign government activities should not be
protected by the privilege.- The court acknowledged that establishing
criteria to determine whether a foreign government was sufficiently
open and reliable would be extremely difficult. 7
Disputing the case-by-case application of the privilege based on
the importance of the information at issue, the court contended that
the public's right to know and the importance of the defamatory information should be carefully balanced against the state's interest in
protecting the reputational interests of private individuals. 98 The court
also reasoned that the public interest approach to applying the
privilege would create a "blanket" for reports of foreign government

90. Id. at 879.
91. Compare Appellant's Brief, supra note 69, at 10-22 and Reply Brief of Appellant, Lee
v. Dong-A Ilbo, 849 F.2d 876 (4th Cir. 1988) (No. 87-2578), at 3-8 with Lee, 849 F.2d at 879-80.
92. Lee, 849 F.2d at 879.
93. Id. at 878-79. The court noted that the public supervision rationale was "indirectly"
applicable in the case in that the American public had a supervision interest in South Korea
because Korea was an ally and aid recipient of the United States. Id. at 878.
94. See Memorandum Opinion, supra note 72, at 9.
95. Lee, 849 F.2d at 878-79.
96. Id. at 879.
97. Id.
98. Id.
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activities, while leaving the defamed private person with no remedy
for reputational injury.- The court further held that proper attribution
in the republication is still not a ground for application of the privilege
because it would not necessarily discourage false or undeserved reliance on foreign reports. 1 0
The court did acknowledge that its decision had "some chilling
effect" upon the news media. The court stated that without the
privilege, newspapers and television stations assume the risk that
hastily gathered and promulgated information is incorrect.1 01 However,
the court argued that the burden on the press to verify reports from
foreign governments did not significantly differ in nature or scope
from the burden they bear in verifying information from non-official
sources.10 2 Accordingly, the court held that the burden is outweighed
°3
by the possible harm to the reputation of private individuals.
In dissent, Judge Kaufman argued for recognition of a "qualified
privilege" to strike a "more appropriate balance between the conflicting
interests at issue."'- Although he agreed with the majority of the
court that the privilege is supported by its three policy justifications,
Judge Kaufman pointedly emphasized that "[i]n a given context, one
of those rationales may well be given more weight than the others."'10 5
In this context, the dissent argued that the public's right to information
should bear greater weight. 10 6 Using Webb 10 7 as a "framework" for
applying the limited privilege to foreign government activities, Judge
Kaufman stated that the legitimate and proper interest of the subject
matter involved should be a determining factor in granting or denying
the privilege to the report.1°s Notwithstanding his emphasis upon the
informational aspect of the privilege in the case at bar, Judge Kaufman
also noted an indirect supervisory function of the privilege in connection with republication of foreign government reports. 9 As an example

99. Id. at 879-80.
100. Id. at 880.
101. Id. The court stated: "Even mere negligence constitutionally can be the basis for
liability when the defamed party is a private person." Id. (citations omitted).
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. (emphasis added).
105. Id. at 881, citing Medico v. Time, Inc., 643 F.2d 134, 142 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 836 (1981); Privilege, supra note 52, at 1102.
106. Lee, 849 F.2d at 881.
107. Webb, 2 Q.B. at 535. For a discussion of Webb, see supra notes 29-36 and accompanying
text.
108. Lee, 849 F.2d at 883 (Kaufman, J. dissenting).
109. Id.
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of indirect supervision, the dissent referred to public pressure exerted
by a number of international human rights groups upon foreign governments. 110 On the other hand, Judge Kaufman dismissed the importance of the agency rationale of the privilege as questionable whenever
the government report is not available to the public, regardless of
whether the government was American or foreign."'
Judge Kaufman questioned the paternalistic assumption of the
majority regarding the way Americans deal with foreign reports published in the media.112 Challenging the court's argument that the risk
of defamation arising from republication of foreign government statements justifies denial of the privilege, Judge Kaufman pointed to the
tendency of many Americans to discredit foreign government statements when that government is perceived as undemocratic by American standards. 113 Judge Kaufman added that proper attribution to the
source of the publication would help Americans evaluate the credibility
of the information.1 4 With regard to the chilling effect and the "relatively small" media involved in the case, Judge Kaufman noted:
In the heat of the moment, faced with the prospect of potentially devastating lawsuits on the one hand and the difficulty
of confirming a story's accuracy on the other, the media
party may not find much comfort in the fact that, if the case
goes to trial, the plaintiff may not be able to prove falsity.
On balance, media defendants, especially the smaller ones
which are targeted to specific audiences, may all too often
decide not to publish. As a result, certain segments of the
American public ... will be deprived of access to information
5
of great importance to them.1
Judge Kaufman proposed a five point test for using the privilege to
escape liability. The media should prove that: (1) the original source
of the news story was an "official report"; (2) that it contained defamat-

110. Id. In a similar vein, a Korean-born American journalism scholar recently suggested
that the Korean-language newspapers in the United States "can . . . contribute to a sound
development of democracy in Korea" by "effectively" using the first amendment in editorializing
the "critical issue" facing South Korea. Lee, The Role of Korean Language Newspapers in the
Korean-American Community, in KOREANS IN NORTH AMERICA: NEW PERSPECTIVES 114
(S. Lee & T. Kwak ed. 1988).
111. Lee, 849 F.2d at 883 (Kaufman, J. dissenting).
112. Id. at 882.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 884.
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ory elements; (3) that the subject matter involved was of public concern; (4) that republication was "fair and accurate"; and (5) that the
16
source of the report was "properly" attributed. 1
IV.

IMPLICATIONS OF LEE FOR THE PRESS

In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, a landmark libel decision, the
United States Supreme Court stated that "[w]hatever is added to the
field of libel is taken from the field of free debate. "117 Lee is a case in
point in that it expands "the field of libel" at the expense of the first
amendment right to free discussion on issues of public concern, especially those related to foreign governments. One writer, characterizing
Lee as "a case of first impression in American law," observed: "Should
Lee prevail, news organizations in the U.S. would conceivably be
vulnerable to a new class of libel suits simply for reporting the actions
of foreign governments.""s Keenly aware of the possible adverse impact of the Fourth Circuit ruling upon the American press as a whole
and the ethnic news media particularly, a Spanish-language television
network, argued in an amicus brief that Lee will cause the media to
limit its news coverage of foreign government reports on matters of
public interest, resulting in self-censorship and a chilling effect on the
media.119 In a similar vein, Judge Kaufman, taking special note of the
chilling effect of the decision upon the news media in general and the
"relatively small" media in particular, stated that the non-profit, noncommercial, pubic television station involved had a viewership of less
than 19,000, and targeted its multi-language programming at many
ethnic communities in the Washington, D.C. area. Further, Judge
Kaufman emphasized that the five Korean-language newspapers in
question were directed at the Korean-American public.120

116. Id.
117. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 272, quoting Judge Edgerton in Sweeny v. Patterson,
76 U.S. App. D.C. 23, 24, 128 F.2d 457, 458 (D.C. Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 678 (1942).
118. Moran, Spy Story Tests Limits of First Amendment Law, LEGAL TIMES, Sept. 12,
1988, at 8.
119. Brief of Amicus Curiae for Appellant at 3, Central Va. Educ. Television Corp. v.
Chang-Sin Lee, 849 F.2d 876 (4th Cir. 1988) (No. 88-1163). Univision, the largest producer of
Spanish-language television programming in the United States argued:
Univision has neither the financial nor human resources to determine the accuracy of foreign government reports, nor does Univision have foreign government
sources who could - or would - verify the official reports of these governments.
If Univision faced potential liability to persons defamed in foreign government
reports, Univision would be unable to broadcast these reports.
Id.
120. Lee, 849 F.2d at 884. n.5 (Kaufman, J. dissenting).

FAIR REPORT PRIVILEGE AS A LIBEL DEFENSE

The immediate impact of the Fourth Circuit's reversal was an
award of $90,000 to Lee by a Virginia federal jury at retrial.121 In the
future, Lee may serve to support the argument against first amendment protection for disseminating foreign government information.
For example, the Lee ruling may apply to defamatory actions resulting
from televising proceedings of the British and Canadian parliaments
by the Cable-Satellite Public Affairs Network (C-SPAN). Since reports
of legislative proceedings in England and Canada are statutorily and
judicially protected under the qualified privilege rule of libel law,,potential libel litigants may find it useful to explore American courts
as their judicial forums, especially if they are "private" individuals.12
Further, the chilling ramifications of Lee will spread far, wide and
deep among the ethnic news media in the United States. As important
social and educational institutions in the immigrant communities, the
ethnic news media often serves as a watchdog of foreign governments
and is often aware of and reports foreign government policy more
quickly than the mainstream newspapers. 1 4 Blanket denial of the fair

121. See Carelli, Libel Privilege, Associated Press, Mar. 6, 1989. Charges against WNVCTV, a public television station, in Fall Church, Virginia, were dismissed on the ground that
Lee was not mentioned by name during the news broadcast of the station and that the two
charts showing how the alleged North Korean agents were organized were "not sufficiently
clear" to identify the plaintiff as such and further were televised only briefly. Telephone interview
with Steve Schneebaum, counsel for Lee (Aug. 28, 1989). For an English translation of the
Korean-language broadcast aired by WNVC-TV on Sep. 15, 1985, see Central Va. Educ. Television Corp. v. Chang-Sin Lee, 849 F.2d 876 (4th Cir. 1988), pet. for cert. filed (U.S. Jan. 12,
1989) (No. 88-1163).
122. For a discussion of English libel law, see P. LEWIS, GATLEY ON LIBEL AND SLANDER
(8th ed. 1981). For a discussion of Canadian libel law, see Skarsgard, Freedom of the Press:
Availability of Defences to a Defamation Action, 45 SASKATCHEWAN L. REV. 287 (1980-81).
123. Under American libel law, a "public" plaintiff is required to prove with convincing
clarity "actual malice" - that is, knowing falsehood or reckless disregard of the truth - on
the part of the defendant to claim damages for defamatory publications relating to matters of
public interest, New York Times, 376 U.S. at 254; Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S.
130 (1967), while a "private" plaintiff more often than not can win general damages by proving
negligence, Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974). By contrast, neither British nor
Canadian libel law recognizes the "actual malice" rule. An English jurist cogently stated: "[I]n
this modern age of international mass communications which includes the provision of satellite
transmissions, it is most likely that the courts will follow the earlier precedents and accept that
the wrong is committed at the place the transmission is received, not where it originated."
Cooper, Defamation by Satellite, SOLICITORS JOURNAL, July 15, 1988, p. 1022. See also It's
All Greek to Me: Libel Law and the Freedom of the Press, NEW L.J., July 3, 1987, pp. 609-10;
DeBenedictis, Moving Abroad, A.B.A. J., Sept. 1989, pp. 38-39.
124. J. FOLKERTS & D. TEETER, VOICES OF A NATION 304 (1989). See also W. CHANG,
MASS COMMUNICATION AND KOREA 230 (1988) (Korean-language newspapers in the United
States "help Korean-Americans gain access to news and information about their native country
that is not contained in English language publications").
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report privilege to the news media for republication of foreign government pronouncement may serve to inhibit certain information of public
interest from being disseminated to the most attentive segment of
American society. Indeed, Lee has already led a Korean-American
organization to threaten to sue two Korean-language newspapers for
publication of defamatory stories based on a South Korean government's announcement. The anti-South Korean government organization, which the Korean National Security and Planning Agency alleged
to have close ties with North Korea, reportedly stated in July 1989
that it would bring a libel action against the newspapers for publishing
the Korean intelligence agency's charges.- Whether the libel threat
is a bona fide attempt at remedying the alleged reputational injury
or not, it is clear that the threat can induce self-censorship and undue
timidity in the Korean-language or other media handling of foreign
news and information.
While American libel law in the context of constitutional consider' 26
ations since 1964 testifies to the "coming of the Information Age,'
the Fourth Circuit was rather myopic in sticking to an increasingly
outdated and narrow concept of the privilege. In the emerging information age, where the international flow of information is the rule
rather than the exception, the Lee court refused to look at the need
for "a new jurisprudential crib" to afford greater breathing space to
the media. 127 The court focused on an assumed increase of risk of
defamation potentially arising from recognition of the privilege for
accurately and fairly reporting foreign government reports.'? In light
of the often contradictory American approach toward the global free
exchange of information, 12 Lee illustrates a troublesome approach to
judicial balancing between freedom of the press and interests of individuals in their reputation.
Further, the reasoning of the federal appellate court in Lee sharply
contrasts with that of Justice Brennan in New York Times. Justice

125. Kim, Travel to North Korea Gaining Popularity and Prospectsfor Unification Movements in South Korea and Abroad, Han-kyoreh Shinmun, Nov. 18, 1989, p. 4 (U.S. ed.).
126. Sanford, supra note 4, at 1.
127. Id.
128. Lee, 849 F.2d at 880. As one commentator forcefully noted, "[A] danger in not protecting reports which could contain some measure of disinformation is reduction of public awareness
of international affairs. An uninformed public could, in turn, be even more susceptible to subtle
influence than a misinformed one." Bech, supra note 5, at 1179.
129. See generally A. MEHRA, FREE FLOW OF INFORMATION: A NEW PARADIGM (1986);
Mehra, Freedom Championsas Freedom Muzzlers: U.S. Violations of Free Flow of Information,
36 GAZETTE 3 (1985).
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Brennan stated that, "Some degree of abuse is inseparable from the
proper use of everything; and in no instance is this more true than
in that of the press."l 3 Although acknowledging the possibility of an
adverse impact upon the American press, the Lee court insisted that
there would be no substantial difference in the burden of the American
news media between verifying information from foreign governments
and from domestic non-official sources. 13, As Editor & Publisheraptly
noted, the basic difference lies in the fact that while domestic information is not too dificult to double-check, information from many governments overseas is almost impossible to check.132 One author agreed,
stating that the practical implications of newspapers' burden in confirming foreign government reports would be "staggering."13- To make
matters worse, the burden would be immeasurably enormous for a
financially weak news media, which characterizes most of the ethnic
news media in the United States.34
In comparing American defamation law with that of Great Britain,
an American legal scholar wrote that "The American approach . . .
reflects a society in which the press is considered to occupy a much
more important role in the resolution of public issues. The press occupies a special position in the American system, a position that accounts for its strong protection against inhibiting defamation laws."m
Nevertheless, the Lee court's sweeping rejection of any kind of
privilege for any report of foreign government action affords little
protection for the press from inhibitory defamation laws. By contrast,
English libel law is more protective of reputation than American law, 3 6
which recognizes a fair report privilege for publication of reports on
foreign judicial proceedings if the reports have "legitimate and proper
interest."

130. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 271, quoting Madison in 4

ELLIOT'S DEBATES ON THE

571 (1876).
131. Lee, 849 F.2d at 880.
132. Insult to Foreign Governments, supra note 15, at 4.
133. Accurate Report, supra note 69, at 34, quoting Jane Kirtley.
134. See e.g., Kelly, In the Land of Free Speech, TIME, July 8, 1985, at 95; Scardino, A
Renaissance for Ethnic Papers, N.Y. Times, Aug. 22, 1989, at D1; Why Ethnic Press is Alive
and Growing, U.S. NEWS &WORLD REPORT, Oct. 29, 1984, at 79. For an illuminating discussion
of various ethnic news media in the United States, see THE ETHNIC PRESS IN THE UNITED
STATES (S. Miller ed. 1987).
135. Schauer, Social Foundations of the Law of Defamation: A Comparative Analysis, 1
J. MEDIA L. & PRAC. 18 (1980). See also M. FRANKLIN & D. ANDERSON, MASS MEDIA LAW
230 (4th ed. 1990).
136. See Franklin & Anderson, supra note 135, at 230; Sanford, supra note 4, at 23-24;
Supperstone, Press Law in the United Kingdom, in PRESS LAW IN MODERN DEMOCRACIES
12 (P. Lahav ed. 1985).
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Historically, the fair report privilege evolved under the common
law as a method of expanding the freedom of the press in the course
of establishing an increasingly open government accountable to its
people. While the United States initially adopted the parameters of
the privilege as drawn by British courts, those same courts later
expanded the privilege. Notwithstanding its variance from state to
state, the privilege has often been used to protect the media's right
to publish information concerning a number of non-governmental proceedings of public interest.
In spite of the growing importance of the free flow of information
among nations, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit in Lee ruled that the privilege applies to reports of American
government actions only, and not to those of foreign governments.
While recognizing the chilling effect of its decision upon the American
press in dealing with foreign news, the court nevertheless dismissed
as negligible the difference between the burden of the media in checking the "truth" of foreign government reports and that of domestic
non-official information. In strong contrast with the precedential
reasoning of the Fourth Circuit in Lee, an English court in 1960 recognized a limited privilege to reports of foreign government proceedings if they contained informational value for the British public.
For the American press in general and the ethnic news media in
particular, Lee will have a chilling effect since it provides a potential
weapon, especially for private figure plaintiffs. Lee may force the
American media to use more caution than ever in determining whether
stories based on foreign government reports are worth the effort to
verify and publish. This is particularly true with the ethnic press,
which relies considerably upon news published in foreign countries
and is financially unable to fight libel actions. In this regard, the
English court's decision in Webb seems to be a more appropriate
balancing approach. What is at stake is not so much the informational
value of the pronouncements for the public as the enormous "inconvenience" to the media resulting from the blanket denial of the privilege.

